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INDUSTRIAL SELF-REGULATION AND 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Harper W. Boyd, Jr.* and Henry Claycamp**, 
THE responsibility of business organizations to society has recently been the subject of increasing attention. Even though most 
American corporations have become substantially more enlightened 
about their responsibilities to the consumer, the feeling abounds in 
certain quarters that business performance in this respect is not al-
ways adequate-particularly with regard to protecting the consum-
er's health and safety. Current inquiries by the federal government 
into the safety of automobiles, cigarettes, and pharmaceuticals, for 
example, indicate that some influential persons believe that more 
governmental intervention on behalf of consumers is necessary. In 
the past, expanded governmental control has frequently resulted 
from the failure of private business to provide the kind of leadership 
that would have obviated federal intervention. 
Historically, businessmen have argued that competition is the 
best pr~tector of the consumer's interests. This assumption implies 
that the market place offers sufficient alternatives and that the con-
sumer knows how to select those products and services which best 
meet his needs. Nevertheless, governmental and business leaders 
have demonstrated a considerable amount of agreement with respect 
to the need of the consumer for assistance in improving his buying 
skills. Over the years, the number of business and governmental or-
ganizations designed to aid the American consumer has risen sharply; 
such organizations include, among others, better business bureaus, 
trade associations, product testing laboratories, consumer advisory 
councils, and state consumer fraud bureaus. 
It is one thing to help the consumer make "better buys" in an 
economic sense, but it is quite another to help him safeguard his 
own life as well as the lives of others. Obviously the consequences in 
these two situations are very different. Typically, whenever threats 
to the consumer's health and safety have become obtrusively appar-
ent, the federal and state governments-in one way or another and 
. with varying degrees of efficiency-have taken action. Responsibility 
for protecting consumers has devolved upon a large number of fed-
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era! agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Food and 
Drug Administration, the United States Department of Agriculture, 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Federal Aviation 
Agency. 
As the affluence of the American society grows, a concern 
about such matters as health, education, and welfare has also 
become more apparent. Some concern derives from technological 
breakthroughs which require control, · such as the development of 
aircraft for mass transportation. In other cases, increased recognition 
of serious threats to public health and safety has led various groups 
of aroused citizens to advocate governmental control. Today, grow-
ing numbers of individuals and organizations believe that the con-
sumer's health and safety are not being adequately protected in at 
least two areas-cigarettes and automobiles. Thus, the following dis-
cussion is directed to the vital issue of whether these two industries 
can voluntarily advance consumers' interests through the imposition 
of adequate safety and health standards, or whether widened federal 
intercession is essential. 
I. CIGARETIES 
Recent studies have left little doubt in the minds of most physi-
cians and scientists that cigarette smoking has harmful effects on 
consumers' health and shortens their life span. It seems to be gen-
erally agreed that cigarette smoking is the principal cause of the in-
creased incidence of lung cancer. This conclusion is particularly 
significant in light of the estimate of the United States Public Health 
Service that nearly eighty per cent of all men in the United States 
have a history of tobacco use and that the incidence of use among 
women has been steadily climbing. 
In a study of 187,783 men between the ages of fifty and sixty-
nine, it was discovered that the death rate from all causes among 
men who had a history of regular cigarette smoking was 1.68 times 
higher than among men who had no such history.1 Furthermore, this 
study indicated that the death rates were closely related to the num-
ber of cigarettes consumed daily.2 The study also showed that the 
relative rate of death from lung cancer among cigarette smokers was 
over ten times greater than among nonsmokers.3 Currently there are 
1. Hammond &: Hom, Smoking and Death Rates-Report on Forty-Four Months 
of Follow-Up of 187,783 Men, 166 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1159, 1172 (1958). 
2. Id. at 1161. 
3. Id. at 1298. 
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approximately forty thousand deaths annually from lung cancer; 
this figure represents an increase of several hundred per cent since 
the mid-1930's. Lung cancer now causes about six per cent of the 
deaths among men in their late fifties and early sixties. Cigarette 
smoking has also been linked to cancer of the mouth, throat, and 
male bladder and to heart disease.4 
A. The Effect of Cultural Attitudes 
Clearly, the best protection against the harmful effects of ciga-
rettes is to stop smoking them, but such a solution is rendered ex-
tremely difficult by the apparent failure of many people to perceive 
a significant menace to health in smoking. For example, according 
to a recent American Cancer Society survey only about, one person 
in five believes that there is a correlation between lung cancer and 
cigarette smoking. This rather startling state of affairs could well be 
the result of selective perception. People believe what they want to 
believe; if a "message" is unpleasant or threatening, in many cases 
the mind refuses to receive it. The "cancer scare" has existed since 
the early 1950's, and yet a decrease in the per capita consumption of 
cigarettes has occurred only in 1953 and 1954. Certainly the increase 
in consumption since 1954 can be attributed in 'considerable part to 
filters, which help smokers rationalize their habit. 
Any movement to reduce cigarette consumption must contend 
with the satisfaction which smoking brings to some deep-seated hu-
man needs. Cultural forces override the obvious , disadyantages of 
smoking-cost, dirtiness, and unhealthiness. According to some 
psychologists, cigarette smoking signifies energy and drive, and many 
people regard cigarette breaks as a reward for hard work. In a recent 
study, it was determined that people smoke because: (1) it is a per-
sonal ritual-one which gives a sense of well-being and security; 
(2) it provides a variety of sensuous pleasures; (3) it symbolizes viril-
ity, maturity, poise, and sophistication; and (4) it facilitates social 
intercourse. 5 
Most people who smoke want to continue to do so and will 
rationalize the habit in some manner. Thus, success in reducing 
the consumption of tobacco probably lies less with increasing indi-
4. See ADVISORY COMM. TO nm SURGEON GENERAL OF nm PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, 
REPORT ON SMOKING AND HEALTH (Pub. No. 1103, 1964). 
5. See Cigarettes, Their Role and Function (1952) (report for the Chicago Tribune 
by Social Research, Inc., Chicago, Ill.). 
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vidual understanding of the "threat" than with reducing the cul-
tural and social forces which sanction and encourage the use of 
cigarettes as desirable symbols. This approach to the problem will 
be exceedingly difficult and will take a long time, since cultural 
attitudes are not easily changed. 
B. Vested Interest Groups 
A number of powerful and vitally interested parties are involved 
with the cigarette industry, and this complicates the discovery of 
a solution to the problem. In addition to consumers, the interested 
parties include the cigarette industry itself, the federal government, 
the national and local advertising media, advertising agencies, to-
bacco growers, state governments, and the American Medical Asso-
ciation. 
The tobacco industry is primarily made up of large companies 
which, in the aggregate, employ over sixty thousand workers and 
have annual sales in excess of eight billion dollars. Although the 
tobacco companies have long been aware of the threat to their in-
dustry, they have done little to diversify, and their major sales and 
profits come almost entirely from the production and sale of ciga-
rettes. They have primarily relied upon the introduction of new 
brands (an expensive undertaking) and advertising to counteract 
all negative influences on smokers. Therefore they remain highly 
vulnerable to any change which would reduce their cigarette sales. 
The federal government has the responsibility to protect the 
health and welfare of all citizens. To date, a variety of governmental 
units have interested themselves in the cigarette problem, including 
the Federal Trade Commission, the Surgeon General's Office, the 
Food and Drug Administration, and the Congress of the United 
States. Although these groups are aware of the dangers associated 
with cigarettes and the increasing incidence of smoking, little effec-
tive action has been taken. Almost two years have elapsed since the 
Surgeon General's report linked cigarette smoking to health prob-
lems, and little has happened to suggest that a "solution" is under 
way. About the only notable action in this regard has been the 
requirement that every pack, box, and carton of cigarettes sold in 
this country after January I, 1966, must carry a warning stating that 
cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health. 6 However, in the 
6. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 79 Stat. 282 (1965). 
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same law that provided for the cautionary label, the Federal Trade 
Commission was specifically barred from requiring health warnings 
in cigarette advertising. Surely, when one ]?ranch of the federal 
government enacts legislation to prevent action by another branch 
with respect to the solution of a severe national problem, it would 
seem clear that a fear exists in at least some government circles 
that the cure may be worse than the disease-especially when an 
effective cure would alienate certain powerful vested interest groups. 
State and federal health agencies, as well as certain health asso-
ciations, have issued educational material in one form or another in 
an attempt to change smoking habits and especially to prevent ado-
lescents from starting to smoke. However, it is doubtful that any 
of these organizations seriously believes that its efforts can do much 
to alter the present state of affairs. 
The activity of the local and national advertising media leaves 
little doubt as to their stand on this matter. As far back as 1962, 
LeRoy Collins, then president of the National Association of Broad-
casters, publicly stated that radio and television codes should pro-
vide unbiased leadership and that, in effect, the industry could not 
ignore the cigarette problem.7 Many people in the broadcasting in-
dustry tried to minimize Collins' statements, and they publicly 
assured tobacco sponsors that they were eager to continue accepting 
cigarette advertising accounts. Perhaps this attitude is not so sur-
prising in view of the tobacco industry's annual expenditure of. 
approximately two hundred million dollars for advertising. Dr. 
Eugene H. Guthrie, chief of the Division of Chronic Diseases of 
the American Public Health Association, recently urged the media 
to reconsider Collins' suggestions and noted that "despite the pretty 
words in the broadcasting code, I see no real change in broadcasting 
practices."8 
Advertising agencies have long been concerned with the ciga-
rette problem because the tobacco industry represents one of their 
most important sources of income. Agency personnel have been rea-
sonably successful in accelerating the demand for cigarettes. In so 
doing, they have successfully equated cigarettes with virility, matu-
rity, sex, and social status. It appears that no agency has ever refused 
to accept any major tobacco account on the ground that the agency's 
7. Address by LeRoy Collins, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters Conference, in Portland, 
Oregon, Nov. 1962. 
8. Address by Dr. Eugene H. Guthrie, The American Public Health Ass'n, Oct. 
1965. 
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efforts would increase the demand for a product which has poten-
tially dangerous consequences for its users. 
Farmers who grow tobacco constitute another interested group. 
Some farmers have benefited, at least in part, from the Government's 
tobacco price support program, which in the early 1960's was pro• 
viding an annual subsidy of nearly fifty million dollars. No evi-
dence suggests that farmers have given up the production of this 
"drug" en masse. 
C. Alternative Solutions 
Given the dynamics of consumer behavior and the behavior of 
manufacturers and governmental bodies, what does effective self-
regulation for the enhancement of consumer welfare imply in the 
case of cigarettes? Two courses of action seem possible: (1) produc-
tion of tobaccos which are not detrimental to health; or (2) reduc-
tion or cessation of the production of cigarettes. Although efforts 
are being made to put the first course of action into operation, there 
is little evidence that positive results will be obtained.9 
Attempts to restrict production or to reduce consumption are 
also fraught with problems. It is inconceivable that cigar~tte pro-
ducers will voluntarily support such a program, since that would be 
tantamount to corporate suicide. However, the cigarette industry 
has established an advertising code office headed by Robert B. 
Meyner, former governor of New Jersey. One of the primary goals 
of this office is to formulate guidelines regarding advertising con• 
tent which appeals to persons under nventy-one years of age. 
Doubt has been expressed in some quarters that the advertising 
code can be effective. Certainly, the code does not strike at the heart 
of the problem, since it appears that the ultimate objective should 
be to convince people to stop smoking. Thus, remedial action must 
center on attempts to minimize the psychological and social values 
of cigarettes. A boycotting of cigarette advertising by national and 
local media and the harnessing of the resources of both the media 
and advertising agencies to develop and implement educational 
campaigns designed to inform the public of the dangers of smoking 
probably would be the most effective action which could be taken 
by the business community. In light of the unsuccessful experience 
with the Volstead Act, extreme action, such as the suppression of 
9. No Substitute in Sight, Bus. Week, Jan. 18, 1964, p. 52. 
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cigarette companies through the classification of cigarettes as a harm-
ful drug, very likely would end up being more harmful to society 
than the hazards associated with smoking. 
The failure of the federal government to move decisively with 
regard to the health problem resulting from smoking cigarettes very 
well may have encouraged the tobacco industry and advertising me-
dia to adopt a somewhat complacent attitude. Similarly, the con-
sumer does not seem to be taking the niatter very seriously, as indi-
cated by the fact that in 1965 cigarette consumption increased 3.5 
per cent despite anti-smoking propaganda, increased state taxes, and 
"innocuous" advertising.10 
It seems clear that little has happened to promote optimism 
about the development of a well-conceived program dealing with 
the cigarette problem. The cigarette industry has done little self-
regulation, and governmental action has dragged. In the meantime, 
great quantities of a supposedly lethal product are being consumed. 
II. AUTOMOBILES 
Automobile accidents account for about fifty thousand deaths 
per year. In fact, such accidents constitute the fourth leading cause 
of death in the United States, and for people between the ages of 
five and thirty the automobile is the leading cause of death. In addi-
tion, several million persons sustain injuries each year from auto-
mobile mishaps. Nearly one out of every three persons admitted to 
hospitals is there because of a car accident, and one out of every 
four partial or complete paralysis cases caused by injury is due to 
the automobile. 
In recent years, car accidents have cost the public tens of billions 
of dollars in property damage, lost wages, medical expense, and 
insurance premiums. Moreover, this large burden does not include 
such costs as those involving the police, the courts, emergency stand-
by facilities, driver licensing, and automobile safety inspection. 
These add more billions of dollars to the annual cost. 
The traditional attitude has been that although automobile 
accidents were recognized as a function of the environment in which 
the car operated (that is, the roads, the driver, and the automobile), 
it was felt that only the driver could be "controlled" to any great 
extent. Thus, past efforts to meet the problem have relied mainly 
IO. See Maxwell, Winstons Press Pall Malls for Lead, Printers' Ink, bee. 10, 1965. 
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on driver education. Without gainsaying the importance of drivers 
in the prevention of accidents, the belief has been growing that the 
vehicles themselves can be improved in ways which will significantly 
reduce deaths and accidents. 
A. Misplaced Emphasis by Both Designers and Consumers 
Although the problems of automobile safety and cigarettes are 
similar in a few respects, they involve basically different considera-
tions. Both products have a profound "hold" on consumers, albeit 
for different reasons. Automobiles are certainly a highly visible sta-
tus symbol, and it is felt by some people that a car tells a lot about 
the owner, including his adventuresomeness, virility, wealth, and so-
cial class. Rarely is an automobile thought of as simply a vehicle for 
transportation. Certainly the several million people who flocked to 
the showrooms during the first few days after the introduction of 
the Mus tang were not just interested in a machine to convey them 
from one point to another. ,., 
As a consequence of the consumer's conception of the role of a 
car, the stylist has emerged as perhaps the most important man in 
the automobile industry. Manufacturers now cater to the public by 
offering, in the aggregate, hundreds of body styles and thousands of 
trim combinations. Annual style changes are surrounded by secrecy 
and are introduced with fanfare which costs tens of millions of 
dollars. It is quite clear that the large sums of money spent to create 
and introduce styling reduce the funds which might othenvise be 
devoted to engineering and safety. 
The relative emphasis placed on style and safety features un-
doubtedly reflects the fact that the effect on consumer demand is un-
questionable, whereas there is little evidence to suggest that consum-
ers make brand choices on the basis of safety. For example, consider 
the elimination of door posts in many models and the continuation 
of fins for several years after reports that they contributed to serious 
accidents. The failure of consumers to give more weight to safety 
features when purchasing automobiles is due to many factors. 
As previously noted, most Americans place the blame for acci-
dents on the driver; seldom has anyone blamed the car, an in-
animate object. Similarly, all safety campaigns are addressed to 
the driver, on the theory that he is the only one who can prevent 
an accident. In fact, accidents are recorded on the basis of driver 
fault, since most traffic laws have been set forth in a way which, if 
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followed, would prevent accidents. If an accident occurs, a traffic 
regulation must have been violated. Such accidents are investigated 
almost exclusively by the police and by insurance companies. This 
process reinforces the law enforcement aspects of such inquiries, and 
only rarely is a question raised about the contribution of the car's 
design to the accident. 
No national or state body that systematically investigates acci-
dents has ever focused upon the design of the cars involved. The 
National Safety Council, which is primarily responsible for compil-
ing and reporting traffic accident statistics, does not compile data 
dealing with the car makes and models involved in accidents or 
report on the effect of automobile design and performance on acci-
dent results. It was not until the early 1950's that vehicle design 
was evaluated in this connection, and then the study was made by 
a university under a grant from the federal government.11 
B. Automotive Design Ignored by Safety Organizations 
In his chapter entitled "The Traffic Safety Establishment," 
Ralph Nader discusses the bewildering array of organizations in-
volved in automobile safety.12 The number of these organizations 
and their interrelationships are substantial, which is to be expected 
in view of the great complexity of the passenger-car system. The sys-
tem includes the automobile industry, the insurance industry, the 
federal government, state and local governments, and a variety of 
associations.13 
Nader points out that safety has been largely delegated to a num-
ber of non-governmental organizations which are subsidized heavily 
by the automobile and insurance industries. These groups include: 
I. The National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Or-
dinances, which periodically publishes a guide for state motor vehi-
cle laws. The guide does not specify any features of vehicle design 
which have been related to injuries sustained from accidents. In 
dealing with vehicular inspection, it provides a check list which, 
if followed, will restore the inspected car to its original condition. 
2. The Automobile Safety Foundation, which awards grants 
11. The research was done at Cornell University. The initial grant of $54,000 was 
made in 1953. 
12. See NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965). 
13. Of course, advertising media and related industries are also mixed in the pat-
tern in one way or another, but they , are not discussed here in the interest of · 
conserving space. 
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to a variety of groups (such as the American Bar Association, the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Safety 
Council, and the American Municipal Association) for support of 
traffic safety programs. 
3. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, which operates 
much like the Automobile Safety Foundation. 
4. The National Safety Council, which is heavily involved with 
safety programs. This organization does little or no research directed 
at accident prevention and has not made any statements about auto• 
mobile designs. 
5. The President's Committee for Traffic Safety, which is sup• 
ported by private industry. The committee's work is largely that of 
distributing safety information materials to other organizations. 
In addition to the above organizations, the American Automo-
bile Association, while a powerful force at both the national and 
local level, has almost never become involved in a critical evaluation 
of automobile designs. Similarly, insurance companies have been 
reluctant to make open attacks on automobile designs, although 
Liberty Mutual did design several cars which incorporated a sub-
stantial number of tested safety features. This program was recently 
terminated. 
The foregoing discussion is a great oversimplification of the 
problems associated with automobile safety, but it does indicate 
that no single agency has any real responsibility (or enforcement 
power) for setting safety standards related to vehicular design. It 
also indicates the preoccupation with driver performance. N everthe-
less, what little research has been done in relating car design to 
accidents shows clearly that cars can be built which will drastically 
reduce injuries received under certain conditions. Without too 
much effort, most recommendations regarding visibility, glare, and 
penetrating steering wheel assemblies could be implemented. 
C. Problems Inherent in Self-Regulation by the Automobile 
Industry 
The problem of automobile safety is more vast and complex 
than cigarette smoking because: (1) more parties are involved; 
(2) the solution is only a matter of degree (better safety design 
as opposed to elimination of cigarette smoking); and (3) the in-
dividual driver automatically involves other people (pedestrians, 
passengers, and other motorists) and their property in his actions. 
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These diverse ramifications affect the availab~e solutions to the 
problem. 
One solution is to permit the automobile companies to respond 
to the problem on an individual basis and take whatever action 
they deem best. It seems evident, however, that, until consumers 
perceive safety features as an important consideration in the pur-
chase of a specific make, hope for the achievement of significant 
results through action by individual firms must ·remain small. Incor-
poration of safety features as standard equipment results, for the 
most part, in higher costs. If consumers do not consider these fea-
tures important, the company using them is placed at a competitive 
disadvantage. Recognizing this, automobile manufacturers, have 
made many safety features optional equipment, but this approach 
does not meet head-on the problem of conflicts between style and 
safety. As long as relevant safety standards are not made obligatory 
for the entire industry, individual manufacturers are not likely to 
resolve such conflicts in favor of increased safety. 
Individual manufacturers, however; can increase the importance 
of the safety appeal. Undoubtedly, all purchasers of automobiles 
possess at least a latent desire for safety. The literature on mass 
communications provides some evidence that repeated appeals to 
latent desires can increase their saliency and make them important 
variables in the decisio:I?- process.14 If a company were to embark on 
such a campaign, it would of course have to devote_ a significant 
amount of its promotion expenditures to safety appeals in order 
to prove that the need for safety was being met by its products. 
Some of the major manufacturers apparently have made a start 
in this direction. For example, the Ford Motor Company recently 
undertook a significant promotion campaign in which the major 
theme was safety.115 Although this undertaking represented only a 
small part of the company's promotional expenditures, and the ma-
14. See HOVLAND, JANIS & KELLEY, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION (1953). If one 
wants to increase the saliency of the desire for safety, appeals must be used which 
allude to the physical danger which might occur as a result of failure to take action 
which would increase safety. See id., ch. 3, for a summary of the literature relating 
to this communication situation and a discussion of the conditions under which such 
communication can be effective. 
15. Announcement of the promotion was reported in The Wall Street Journal, 
Dec. 27, 1965, p. 5, col. 4. The news story reported that the promotion would include 
a twelve-page insertion in Time Magazine and sixteen-page supplements in twenty-
five Sunday newspapers. Included in the story was an announcement by the president 
of the University of Michigan that an institute to study and report on safety aspects 
of vehicles, drivers, roads, and traffic would be established at Ann Arbor with a 
$10 million grant from the four major automobile manufacturers. 
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jority of the advertising space was devoted to aspects of safety other 
than automobile design, considerable attention was given to the 
new safety features which are standard equipment on 1966 products 
of the Ford Motor Company. As might be expected, most of these 
features-seat belts, emergency flashers, and padded visors-are 
easily demonstrated to and recognized by the consumer. N everthe-
less, if such promotions were carried out on a broad scale by the 
entire industry, it is possible that safety could become a more im-
portant dimension of competition, and the consumer would benefit. 
A more pervasive solution would be for the industry to delegate 
complete responsibility for specifying and enforcing design stan-
dards to an autonomous agency. The agency could be either a new 
-organization specifically established for this task or an existing but 
somewhat inactive body, such as the Automotive Safety Foundation, 
which could be revitalized. The functions of such a unit would in-
clude the collection and analysis of reports on accidents, research 
on the effect of alternative designs on safety under a variety of 
conditions, performance of the engineering required to translate the 
research results into product specifications, and control over the 
products manufactured by the automobile industry. 
Such an agency would have to be an organization of con-
siderable size and power. The need for highly qualified engineers 
and researchers (who would come from a variety of disciplines, 
including medicine and related areas) and the high cost of labora-
tory equipment would certainly indicate that such a center would 
be expensive to set up as well as to maintain. Some rough idea of 
possible costs can be obtained by looking at the funds spent by the 
federal government in its aviation safety work. In recent years, the 
annual expenditure has varied between approximately thirty-five 
and sixty million dollars. Even though airplanes are far more com-
plicated than automobiles, there is no reason to believe that a pas-
senger-car safety center would cost less to operate than the aviation 
safety program. Indeed, an automotive safety center might be sub-
stantially more expensive because of the difficulties of monitoring 
car accidents, working with engineers and designers from the various 
companies, and making certain that the minimum standards were 
effectively implemented in new cars. However, since the annual 
profits of the automobile manufacturers run into many hundreds of 
millions of dollars, the cost of such a center should not be regarded 
as the critical issue. It is also likely that the expense would eventually 
be passed on to the consumer. 
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A more serious question regarding the feasibility of such a cen-
ter concerns its investigative powers and the legal consequences of 
its findings. Since automobile accidents involve local law enforce-
ment authorities, local courts, and insurance companies, the ques-
tion of how such a center could obtain cooperation arises. Would 
such persons permit· their work to be scrutinized closely by an out-
sider? Some of the problems could undoubtedly be overcome by 
delegating the responsibility for data collection to a prestigious 
institution such as a university. 
A related problem would arise from investigations that resulted 
in the center requiring a change iIJ. standards for one of the auto-
mobile manufacturers. It could be reasoned that the imposition of 
such a requirement was tantamount to a finding that the manufac-
turer had been guilty of faulty design. Moreover, if such an investi-
gation were instituted as a result of a series of accidents, it is likely 
that representatives of the center could be forced to testify as expert 
witnesses regarding the institution's conclusions as to design safety. 
The consequences of such disclosures could be devastating to the 
industry. 
The specter of collusion would also undoubtedly be raised if 
an effective safety center were established. It is possible that effec-
tive safety standards, when applied, would raise the cost of manufac-
turing automobiles, and prices would be increased to _cover both 
increased costs and a profit on the safety features. Increased car 
prices would raise a hue and cry from the Government as well as 
from consumers. The car is not only a vital part of life for most 
Americans, but it is also one of the most expensive possessions of 
a consumer. Automobile manufacturers would be accused of using 
safety as a rationale for price escalation. Thus, it is likely that the 
industry would be forced to submit to costly harassment by the 
Government. 
Another aspect of the "collusion" problem has to do with the 
impact of safety standards on design. It is possible that the current 
variability of styles and designs would be substantially reduced, 
resulting in increased similarity among makes and models. This 
effect would be quite obvious and would undoubtedly lead some 
people to conclude that a conspiracy was underway to reduce design 
costs and the number of real alternatives available to the consumer. 
The oligopolistic nature of the car industry would intensify this 
suspicion. 
Finally, we are faced with the problem of who would control 
1252 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:1239 
such a center. Because of the power which would be required 
for an effective safety center, it would need to be controlled in an 
unbiased way, but the size and scope of the automobile industry 
would make it hard to find a "disinterested" board of directors. In 
addition, would the Government tolerate such power in the hands 
of a single unit without governmental monitoring? On the other 
hand, would the automobile companies voluntarily delegate such a 
substantial part of their decision making to an outside agency over 
which they had no control? Given the expenses involved in such 
self-regulation and the inherent dangers of provoking governmental 
interference, this delegation is not likely to occur except in response 
to an imminent threat of governmental regulation. 
D. The Only Effective Solution-Governmental Regulation of 
Sa/ ety Standards 
It thus appears unlikely that the industry can or will attempt 
self-regulation to any substantial extent. Because of this and the 
obvious problems of individual state regulation, it can be argued 
that if safety design standards are to be established and regulation 
undertaken, such action must be taken by the federal government. 
The Government has a successful prototype in the Federal Aviation 
Agency, which promulgates and enforces safety regulations applying 
to all civilian aircraft. The FAA inspects and licenses all such air-
craft, and also licenses pilots and aviation mechanics. In addition, 
the Civil Aeronautics Board investigates all airplane accidents. If 
an investigation reveals that a carrier or airplane manufacturer was 
negligent in following prescribed rules or was guilty of substandard 
workmanship which was a causal factor in the accident, then the.. 
party or parties involved can be sued for damages. 
Not all governmental agencies have been as successful as the 
FAA and the CAB. For example, throughout its history the Food and 
Drug Administration has suffered from the low pay and prestige 
accorded many of its Bureau of Medicine positions, pressures from 
politicians acting on incomplete scientific evidence, and the prob-
lems of cooperating with scientists employed by the pharmaceu-
tical industry. The large amount of work thrown on the FDA 
by the 1962 drug reform legislation has made it difficult for the 
· Agency to carry out its basic responsibilities.16 Thus, the effi-
16. For a report on the problems facing the FDA's medical director, see Spivak, 
Regulating Drugs, The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 28, 1965, p. 8, col. 4. 
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ciency of a governmental agency is not by any means automatic. 
Unless Congress were to set up an agency with the proper authority 
and funds, the results would probably not be impressive. Apparently 
the Johnson administration has reasoned along these lines; accord-
ing to recent statements in the press, the President may soon propose 
to Congress a five;year automobile safety program which will cost 
about five hundred million dollars. It is reported that the bill would 
empower the Secretary of Commerce to fix minimum safety require-
ments for all vehicles sold in the United States. Thus, the Adminis-
tration appears to be taking a stronger stand on the safety issue than 
that proposed by Senator Ribicoff in the National Highway Safety 
Bill. The major provisions in Senator Ribicoff's bill deal with the 
consolidation of safety programs, driver education, and uniform 
inspection to eliminate defective automobiles. Whether either bill 
would meet the design safety problem sufficiently is not known. 
III. SUMMARY 
Considerable evidence indicates that the consumer's health and 
safety are not adequately protected with respect to cigarettes and 
automobiles. Recent studies leave little doubt that cigarette smok-
ing shortens the life span of human beings and that automobile 
accidents kill about fifty thousand persons each year and injure sev-
eral million others. The cost to society of damage done by cigarettes 
and automobiles runs into many billions of dollars annually. 
Many powerful vested interest groups are involved with the 
cigarette problem. To date, neither they nor the federal government 
have indicated an intention of taking any serious action to effect a 
solution. In the case of automobile safety, a substantial number of 
organizations are involved, and safety has been delegated to non-
governmental groups heavily subsidized by the automobile and in-
surance industries. No single agency has any real responsibility for 
setting safety standards related to vehicle design. 
Industrial self-regulation is not likely to emerge in the case of 
cigarettes. Tobacco companies are not going to commit corporate 
suicide, and there is no indication that cigarette promotions are 
being refused by the advertising media. On the other hand, the 
Government has not offered any effective programs to reduce or 
eliminate the hazard. The problem of automobile safety design is 
more complex than that of cigarettes. Because th~ incorporation of 
safety features is likely to increase costs and because the consumer 
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does not consider safety a dominant factor in selecting an auto-
mobile, self-regulation on an individual company basis is not likely 
to occur. An autonomous agency with delegated responsibility for 
specifying design standards is also probably not feasible because of 
legal, control, and cost considerations. Thus, governmental regu-
lation patterned after that provided by the Federal Aviation Agency 
would seem to be the most effective solution. 
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